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Abstract—Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are nowadays mas-
sively integrated in daily life: homes, factories, or public places.
This technology offers attractive services to improve the quality
of life as well as new economic markets through the exploita-
tion of the collected data. However, these connected objects
have also become attractive targets for attackers because their
current security design is often weak or flawed, as illustrated
by several vulnerabilities such as Mirai, Blueborne, etc. This
paper presents a novel approach for detecting intrusions in smart
spaces such as smarthomes, or smartfactories, that is based on
the monitoring and profiling of radio communications at the
physical layer using machine learning techniques. The approach
is designed to be independent of the large and heterogeneous
set of wireless communication protocols typically implemented
by connected objects such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee, Bluetooth-
Low-Energy (BLE) or proprietary communication protocols. The
main concepts of the proposed approach are presented together
with an experimental case study illustrating its feasibility based
on data collected during the deployment of the intrusion detection
approach in a smart home under real-life conditions.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, IoT, Security, Signal, Com-
munication, IDS, Smart-home, Detection, Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has received increasing interest
in the last few years. Indeed, smart connected objects are
nowadays widely used in our daily life activities, at home as
well as in public and professional spaces. Many of such objects
(speakers, TVs, cameras, doors, shutters, lightbulbs, sensors,
etc.), that used to lack connectivity in the past, can nowadays
interact with other objects nearby or remotely through the
Internet, using heterogeneous communication protocols, such
as Zigbee, Bluetooth or even non-standardized ones. While
such evolution enables the development of attractive services
for the users, serious concerns can be raised with respect to
the new opportunities offered by IoT objects to attackers to
threaten the security and privacy of the users [1].
Pervasive connectivity is more and more used to manage
more efficiently the home energy consumption [2], the physi-
cal security of house appliances [3], or just for entertainment.
Hence, a smarthome has become nowadays a quite complex
environment, composed of heterogeneous connected objects,
including mobile devices, that may be compliant or not to
standard communication protocols. Such smart objects gen-
erally belong to different users living in the smart home, or
to some visitors who bring their own personal devices. Also,
several communication protocols with different characteristics
(channel frequency, bandwidth, etc.) are generally used in
the same connected environment. The objects may interact
through gateways but may also communicate directly through
ad hoc protocols. In the same time, thanks to the ability of the
connected objects to be programmed to automatically execute
some predefined tasks, using e.g., new emerging devices
like home assistants (Google Home, Amazon Echo, . . . ), the
communication patterns resulting from the activities carried
out in smarthomes become more and more deterministic, at
least at some periods of the day [4]. For instance, one may
wish to program automatically the opening of his connected
shutters each morning at a specific moment and may wish to
program his connected coffee machine at the same time. This
trend is likely to be amplified in the coming years.
The large majority of smart object users are not security
experts and are not aware of the vulnerabilities and the security
threats induced by their network-accessible objects. Therefore,
smarthomes become relevant targets for attackers, for different
objectives. First, as some objects are often used to collect
personal information about the environment, the privacy of
users can be threatened if one of them is compromised.
Furthermore, many objects are currently used to protect the
physical access to the house, e.g., camera, locks, blinds, and
an attacker may try to corrupt them to enter the house without
causing any damage [5]. The recent massive attack Mirai [6]
shows that connected devices with weak security protections
may also be compromised in order to be enrolled in a botnet.
The traditional IT security protections, such as firewalls
or network intrusion detection systems (IDS) usually rely on
a central device, such as a gateway or a proxy, to analyze
the network communications, in order to block unauthorized
communications or to raise alarms. However, such solutions
have generally a limited scope. In particular, direct commu-
nications between objects using ad hoc or proprietary proto-
cols are generally not covered. Also, some existing solutions
consist in the development of specific monitors covering the
communications associated to only a few and already known
specific wireless protocols (in particular WiFi). Such solutions
are not efficient to cover the large set of protocols used by the
variety of connected objects deployed in a smart home. Also,
they are not easy to adapt to take into account new objects or
communication protocols integrated in the smarthome.
The objective of this paper is to propose a novel approach
to detect attacks targeting a smarthome that addresses the
shortcomings of existing solutions. Our intrusion detection ap-
proach, called RadIoT, consists in the monitoring of the radio
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communication activities generated by the connected objects
and the profiling of such activities based on machine learning
techniques. The advantages of operating at the physical layer
level are to be: 1) independent of the different communication
protocols used so far, and to take into account new commu-
nication protocols that may emerge, 2) transparent from the
objects point of view, i.e., the approach does not require the
modification of the connected objects, and 3) easily adaptable
to any smarthome network configuration modification (for
example, addition or removal of new objects).
The implementation of the proposed approach is based on
the deployment in a smarthome of a set of probes to capture
the radio communication activities on predefined frequency
bandwidths, using Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology,
and the elaboration of a set of models using machine learning
techniques that reflect the radio activities recorded in a smart
home without attacks during different periods of the day, the
week, or during vacations. Each deviation from these models
is considered as a potential malicious attack and raises an
alert. The models can take into account malicious activities
that possibly involve the collaboration of several smart objects.
This paper describes the main concepts behind the proposed
approach and presents some preliminary experiments aimed at
assessing its feasibility in a real environment. It is organized as
follows. Section II first presents a state of the art of IoT attacks
and network solutions to detect them. Section III explains the
threat model considered, as well as examples of malicious
behaviors that our IDS is able to detect. Section IV presents the
main concepts behind our proposed intrusion detection system.
Section V and Section VI present respectively the architecture
of the solution and how the model is generated. Next, Section
VII describes the experimentation carried out and the detection
results of our approach. Finally, Section VIII discusses the
limitations and the future work to improve our IDS.
II. RELATED WORK
This section focuses first on smarthomes related attacks
targeting IoT devices, then on some security mechanisms
proposed in related work to cope with such attacks.
In the recent years, several attacks based on traditional
Internet protocols exploiting weaknesses in IoT devices used
in smarthomes have been reported [5]. A popular example is
the Mirai worm. The aim of Mirai was to take the control of
many connected objects in order to create a botnet, that is then
used to attack the DNS servers of some famous companies like
Amazon and Facebook [6]. One of the vulnerabilities exploited
by Mirai was the presence of weak credentials configured by
default during the initialization of the connected objects.
Other attacks exploit weaknesses in the short distance IoT
communication protocols, like Zigbee, Bluetooth or even in
proprietary ones. In [7], E. Ronen et al. show that knowing
the master key of the Philips Hue system, unfortunately shared
between all gateways and lightbulbs, it is possible to reset
the connection between a gateway and a lightbulb and then
control the lightbulb. The attacker only needs to send one very-
high powered message from outside of the building to initiate
a new connection with the lightbulbs. This vulnerability was
investigated to design a potential worm for lightbulbs [8].
M. Ryan [9] presents a vulnerability in BLE devices allow-
ing attackers to brute-force encryption keys. This vulnerability
was used in a few technical demonstrations to show that an
attacker can open doors just by using a replay attack [10].
Another example is the BlueBorne attack [11] that allows an
attacker to exploit some weak implementations of Bluetooth
on most architectures (IoT, computers, smartphones) to control
or extract information remotely. Some classifications of IoT
vulnerability attacks have been also proposed. For example,
the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [12]
describes common vulnerabilities of IoT devices like memory
leak, authentication weakness, etc. In [7], attacks are cate-
gorized according to their impact on the functionality of the
device as perceived by end-users.
Many existing security protection mechanisms for IoT focus
on the traditional Internet protocols, e.g., WiFi and Ethernet.
For example, IoT SENTINEL [13] probes WiFi and Ethernet
traffic flows through the access point of the smarthome.
The connected devices are identified by their MAC address.
The tool identifies the device type as well as its potential
vulnerabilities reported in the CVE database. Vulnerable IoT
devices are isolated from the Internet and from the other
ones using filtering rules. Accordingly, the device functionality
maybe heavily impacted by the filtering mechanisms, and as
the IoT objects cannot be easily patched, they could become
useless. Also, it is noteworthy that the attacks carried out
through other wireless protocols, like ZigBee or Bluetooth,
are not covered by IoT SENTINEL.
Some research works [14] investigated the possibility to
use RSSI (Radio Signal Strength Indicator) to detect physical
intrusions within a Bluetooth connected area. This indicator
is mostly used for indoor localization [15]. To our viewpoint,
such detection approaches are promising, and, in this paper,
we propose to extend them to detect logical intrusions on any
protocols, based on the monitoring of radio communications.
To conclude, current solutions to detect attacks on the
IoT networks only partially cover the large set of protocols
and communication technologies that are typically used in
smarthomes. These solutions also require the development of
specific probes for each relevant protocol, or necessitate a
considerable reconfiguration effort in case of wireless network
evolution, e.g. change of the WiFi frequency [16].
In this paper, we propose RadIoT, a novel solution that is
aimed at filling this gap, and that is designed to complement
existing solutions targeting traditional protocols such as WiFi.
The proposed approach is protocol agnostic and can cover all
the communication protocols available in the target IoT net-
work. It consists in monitoring and profiling the radio activities
at the physical layer, especially by observing the power and
time of transmission. Moreover, this solution requires only a
light learning phase, without impacting the objects.
III. THREAT MODEL
In a smarthome context, the attacker can proceed remotely
(e.g. without physically interacting with the devices) either i)
from the Internet or outside the smart place, or ii) within the
smart place. Its objectives may be to:
• modify the devices to prepare a home intrusion [17];
• collect confidential information within the devices [18];
• control devices in order to bounce elsewhere [8];
• control devices to affect their functionality [7].
To compromise the targeted devices, the attacker can either
use his own devices or use an already compromised one. In
both situations, the attack will result in malicious interactions
with the devices of the smarthome, that may occur concur-
rently with the legitimate interactions.
In our study, we focus on the monitoring of the radio-
activities generated by such interactions, considering both the
time and the location of the activities. A malicious behavior
corresponds to the detection of a radio activity corresponding
to one of the following situations:
1) from a location that is never used by users;
2) using a wireless technology never used by users;
3) during an unusual period of the day;
4) following an unusual scenario (e.g., switch on lights
without disabling the alarm first);
5) with unusual intensity.
According to Section II, most of existing solutions focus
on the monitoring of the communications through a central
gateway in the smarthome, and investigate in particular the
traffic at the network layer. Hence, they are likely to be ineffi-
cient to detect the aforementioned malicious behaviors. In the
next section, we present our proposed approach that provides
a complementary protection mechanism and a better coverage
of potential malicious activities targeting smarthomes.
IV. APPROACH OVERVIEW
To provide protection against the threat scenarios presented
in Section III, a solution could be to develop a specific probe
for each communication protocol used in the smarthome, and
to monitor the corresponding network traffic. However, this
solution would be not practically feasible as it requires the
availability of the specification of all the protocols used in
the smarthome, which is not always possible and it would be
costly. Also, it would be not suitable for dynamic environments
characterized by the evolution of the wireless IoT technologies
used, e.g. when new devices are introduced.
Our solution named RadIoT monitors the radio activities
on frequencies commonly used by wireless communications.
It considers only the received physical signal intensity, without
relying on the specification of the protocols. Also it does not
require any modification of the existing devices.
Two main phases can be distinguished. The first one deals
with the creation of a reference model that represents the
radio-activities generated by the normal use of the connected
devices in the absence of malicious activities. The second
phase corresponds to the detection of illegitimate behaviors or
misbehaviors. It consists in 1) the real-time capture of radio
activities in the smarthome, 2) the comparison of the captured
data with the reference model as explained in the section
VII-C, and 3) the generation of alerts whenever a deviation
from the reference model is detected.
IDS
Living Room
Kitchen Restroom Bathroom
Bedroom
Radio Probe
Figure 1. A smarthome example integrating the IDS and one radio probe
As illustrated in Figure 1, RadIoT relies on two main
components: 1) one or several Radio Probes deployed in
strategic locations of the home, and 2) the IDS that processes
the data received from the probes and implements the detection
models.
The probes are based on Software-Defined Radio (SDR)
technology and capture the radio activities on specific frequen-
cies. These activities are characterized by the signal power, the
reception time and the frequency used. The frequencies are
specified taking into account the deployed devices, and can
easily be adapted to take into account new protocols.
V. RADIO PROBE
The Radio Probe must be easily deployed in a smarthome.
In addition, it must fulfill the following requirements:
• Capability to monitor activities on different bandwidths;
• Low cost
• Easy configuration and installation with the help of a
security expert;
• Portability;
• Secure connection to the IDS;
• Non-invasiveness, i.e. no modification of IoT devices.
These requirements can be fulfilled with a Software-
Defined-Radio (SDR) peripheral monitoring radio signals on
a large frequency bandwidth. Accordingly, the probe can eas-
ily observe communications on traditional protocols (Zigbee,
Bluetooth, 868MHz, etc.) with no reconfiguration.
As illustrated in Figure 2, two main tasks can be distin-
guished: the observation task consists in capturing the radio
activities on relevant frequencies, and the processing task
consists in formatting the raw data and extracting information
to be used by the IDS to elaborate the detection models.
We measure the radio-communication power (in dBm) as-
sociated to the monitored frequencies. Figure 3 summarizes
the main concepts and notations illustrating the power mea-
surement process and the corresponding outputs.
Figure 2. Radio activities monitoring
Figure 3. Waterfall notation
Relevant frequencies to be monitored by the probe cor-
respond to discontinuous ranges (e.g. [800-900MHz] and
[400-500MHz] generally used for home-automation and [2.4-
2.5GHz] used for WiFi, Zigbee etc.) [19]. In the following,
these frequencies will be represented as a set F of M
frequency ranges Fi = (fsi , f
e
i ), between f
s
i and f
e
i KHz,
(M = |F |). The measurement of the power associated to these
frequencies implies the use of Fast Fourier Transforms (FFT).
Let us denote b, the bin width, in KHz, which corresponds to
the frequency sampling resolution of the FFT.
Depending on the SDR technology, several FFTs may be
needed to cover the relevant frequency ranges (e.g., HackRF
is able to compute the FFT on a 20MHz bandwidth). The
measurement of the power associated to Fi at a given time
stamp is called a sweep and the resulting vector is noted Si.
This vector contains Li =
fei −fsi
b values, corresponding to the
powers measured for each bin of the FFT. The rate at which
this sweep is achieved depends on the SDR used. Let us denote
by T the time in seconds between two consecutive sweeps.
The SDR is configured to calculate the sweeps for all the
M considered frequency ranges. This process is repeated con-
tinuously. The results of N consecutive sweeps are aggregated
together to form a waterfall noted W . The j-th waterfall
obtained with the SDR is noted W j . In the following, the
j superscript will be omitted. Let us d enote by Wi the subset
of the waterfall associated to the frequency range (fsi , f
e
i ).
Each waterfall is time-stamped with the date t of its first
sweep: (t,W ). Hence, a waterfall is a matrix with a size of∑
i Li × N . It is usually displayed as illustrated in figure 4.
This figure represents a waterfall composed of 100 sweeps
(with T =0.0375 seconds) that was measured by a HackRF
peripheral configured for a frequency range 400 MHz to
500 MHz. The horizontal index k corresponds to the k-th bin
and the vertical index l to the l-th sweep. Thus, the pixel at
position (l, k) corresponds to the power Wi[l, k], observed at
time t + l ∗ T , associated to the frequency fsi + k ∗ b KHz.
The scale on the right of the figure maps the pixel color to the
measured power: yellow corresponds to a high power signal
while dark-blue corresponds to a low power signal.
Figure 4. Waterfall example
The power measurements are stored using the type float-
64, then the size of each waterfall is 8 ∗N ∗∑i Li and they
are generated at speed of 8 ∗
∑
i Li
T bytes per seconds. It is
noteworthy that the IDS can be connected to several probes,
hence the outputs are tagged with the probe id.
VI. MODEL GENERATION
The model implemented in the IDS to detect attacks is based
on machine learning techniques widely used to implement
anomaly-based IDS. During the learning phase, the waterfalls
collected through the radio probes reflect legitimate activities
in the smarthome and are used to calibrate the model. This
section details the model generation as well as the learning
algorithm chosen, which is the autoencoder. More information
is provided about the features used as inputs of the autoencoder
and how these are extracted from the waterfalls.
A. Model selection
Two main characteristics of the collected data are relevant
to guide the IDS model design decisions. First, the probes con-
tinuously collect during the learning phase the radio-activities
at a fine granularity, generating a large amount of waterfalls
that need to be pre-processed to reduce the data size. Second,
all waterfalls are associated to only one class of behavior: the
legitimate one. The problem addressed in our context is to
detect an anomaly in the current observation in comparison
with a reference model. In machine learning, this problem
is defined as a classification problem. Several classification
algorithms are available such as a Neural Networks, K-NN,
Support Vector Machines (SVM), etc. The selection of the
most suitable algorithm depends on the data collected. For
example, Y. Sung [14] investigates the use of Bayesian net-
works to detect intruders within a smart environment, through
the use of RSSI in Bluetooth beacon. E. Hodo and al. [20]
presents an IDS based on artificial neural networks (ANN),
able to detect DDoS/DoS attacks on IoT networks, with 99.4%
accuracy against simulated attacks.
Our problem is related to a one-class machine learning
classifier that uses only positive examples. In addition, due to
the large size of the collected data (see section V) and in order
to achieve reasonably low processing times, data dimension
reduction is required to reduce the number of random variables
under consideration (i.e. features). For the results presented
in the following, we use an autoencoder neural network that
provided satisfactory results in similar situations [21]. The
comparative analysis of different machine learning algorithms
is planned for future work.
B. Autoencoder neural network
An autoencoder is a deep neural network [22] that is
trained to produce outputs that are identical to its inputs. It
is structured as a non-recurrent feedforward neural network
with the same number of inputs and outputs, and with an
odd number of hidden layers including a bottleneck. The
bottleneck allows to learn a compressed representation of the
inputs that enables the reconstruction of the outputs from
these inputs. An autoencoder is composed of two parts. The
first part encodes the inputs x onto the first layers until the
bottleneck, as a function f(x). The second part is composed
of the other layers that represent a function g(y) aimed at
expanding the dimension of y. The overall goal is to learn
these two functions so that g(f(i)) ≈ i where i corresponds
to the inputs. The learning process of these two functions relies
on the minimization of the loss function L(x, g(f(x))) where
L can correspond for instance to the mean squared error.
C. Features extraction
To generate a representative model of the legitimate radio
communications, the autoencoder algorithm requires the def-
inition of relevant features used as inputs. These features are
extracted from the waterfalls generated from the data collected
by the probes. The entire waterfall W or any Wi or any sub-
bandwidth of these Wi can be used. More precisely, each
waterfall is split according to the bandwidth or to the relevant
frequencies considered. If necessary, a given bandwidth can
be split into overlapped slices. So, a waterfall can be split
into ZigBee channels and into WiFi channels. The features
can be based on the main metrics that characterize the signal
power on the selected communication bandwidths: maximum,
minimum, mean, median, standard deviation and sum. Hence,
considering a range of frequencies ks..ke of the waterfall W ,
these metrics are formally defined as follows:
Ω(W,ks, ke) = { W [k, l] | k ∈ [ks..ke], l ∈ [0..N [ }
Max(W,ks, ke) = max Ω(W,ks, ke)
Min(W,ks, ke) = min Ω(W,ks, ke)
Mean(W,ks, ke) = mean Ω(W,ks, ke)
Median(W,ks, ke) = median Ω(W,ks, ke)
Std(W,ks, ke) = std Ω(W,ks, ke)
Sum(W,ks, ke) =
∑
Ω(W,ks, ke)
Additional features are included to take into account the
time stamp of the waterfall as explained in [23]. Then, in
order to learn the radio-activities patterns evolution over time,
the features extracted from the ten last waterfalls also used
as inputs in the autoencoder, considering a sliding window. In
total, 80 features are used for the training of the autoencoder.
The autoencoder takes these features as inputs. By using
backpropagation algorithm, it is fitted to match the legitimate
behaviors. Then, during the monitoring and detection phase,
this model is used as the reference model. During operation,
the IDS extracts the features for each waterfall and sends
the corresponding vector to the autoencoder. If the outputs
show significant deviations from the input vector, i.e. more
than a fixed threshold S, an anomaly is reported to the
users. The threshold S is calculated empirically through an
experimentation phase presented in the next section.
VII. EXPERIMENTATION
This section describes some preliminary experiments we
have carried out in order to assess our intrusion detection
approach in a inhabited smarthome, purposely equipped with
various connected objects. This environment is illustrated
in figure 1. Various connected devices are deployed in the
smarthome using different heterogeneous protocols (Blue-
tooth, ZigBee, WiFi and 433MHz) listed in Table I.
Table I
DEPLOYED IOT DEVICES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
ID Name Aim Protocol Number
1 Netatmo Sensors Air Ambiant Sensor WiFi 1
2 D-Link Camera Live Streaming Video WiFi 1
3 Phones, Laptops General Internet Services WiFi 4
4 Parrot Flowerpot Flowerpot Bluetooth 1
5 Terraillon scale Scale BLE 1
6 Philips Hue Lightbulb ZigBee 2
7 Hoover Neato Hoover WiFi 1
8 Domotic sensor Simulated 433MHz 1
For this preliminary study aimed at exploring the feasibility
of the proposed approach, a single probe was installed in the
smarthome to capture the radio activities generated by the IoT
devices. The first experiment consisted in capturing the radio
activities generated by the devices without deliberately inject-
ing attacks. These data were used as training set to validate
a first reference model. In a second phase, we set another
experiment with a new reference model established the same
way. Then some attacks were carried out simultaneously with
legitimate behavior in an attack dataset. This data were used
to assess the detection performance of the IDS. The following
subsections provide some details about the elaboration of the
model implemented by the IDS and the datasets used for its
training and testing. Information is also provided about the
generation of the attack data as well as the modus operandi
of injection. Finally, the results are presented and discussed.
A. Data collection and RadIoT model training
Our probe is a HackRF One device, connected to a Rasp-
berry Pi 3 equipped with a hard drive to store the captured
Figure 5. Test error - dataset 2 at 800-900MHz
data1. For this experiment, we focused only on three band-
widths, 400-500 MHz, 800-900 MHz and 2.4-2.5 GHz, which
cover most of the communications usually used in IoT, using a
low cost antenna. Moreover, the two hackrf sweep parameters
”number of samples” and ”bin width”, that control the FFT
resolution, are set to 8192 and 200 KHz respectively.
Two different datasets were collected. The first experiment
consisted of 300GB of radio activities recorded continuously
during 2 consecutive weeks, without any attack activity, to
validate and calibrate the autoencoder. The second experiment
consisted in collecting a training/testing dataset of 7 days with
an attack activity of 2 days with different attacks covering the
three selected frequency bandwidths.
As regards the training and testing of a reference model,
70% of the dataset is used to set a reference model and the
remaining 30% for testing and validating this model. For both
experiments, the datasets are processed to extract the features
as described in Section VI. More precisely, each waterfall is
split into 400-500 MHz, 800-900 MHz and 2.4-2.5 GHz slices
and one features vector is generated for each slice.
The autoencoder models are generated with TensorFlow
library2. For both experiments, the autoencoder is composed
of 3 hidden layers respectively with 87.5%, 75% and 87.5%
neurons on each. Two activation functions have been tested:
softplus and sigmoid. softplus provides better results. A refer-
ence model is then defined for each bandwidth considered.
B. RadIoT attacks campaign
The attack injection campaign is composed of two steps: 1)
attack definition and simulation; 2) attack injection.
1) Attack definition and simulation: As our detection ap-
proach only relies on the analysis of radio activities, it is
not necessary to perform real attacks, including their exact
and complete payloads, but it is sufficient to simulate these
attacks by generating radio activity samples emulating the cor-
responding behaviour. An attack is defined by: 1) the intensity
of the signal power for the selected frequencies considering
three levels (High, Normal or Low) and 2) its duration (Long,
or short). An additional parameter is also defined to specify
1https://github.com/mossmann/hackrf/wiki
2https://www.tensorflow.org/
Figure 6. Attack error - dataset 2 at 800-900MHz
the time between consecutive attacks. The definition of the
considered attacks was based on the knowledge collected from
published IoT attacks.
We selected a set of eight attacks described in the table II.
Some of them are performed with a generic signal transmitter
such as the HackRF device (such as 868 MHz attack), and
some are performed with dedicated dongles (such as Wifi Dos
attack or Rogue Access Point (AP) Attack [24]). For each
attack, Table II provides the information about the intensity
and the duration of the corresponding signal. Let us note
that DOS attacks (1 and 8) are simulated by generating a
high power message followed by a simulated shutdown of
the legitimate AP. This set is then injected in the smarthome
experimental environment during several days, to represent the
different situations of malicious behavior described in Section
III. The parameters used to calibrate the intensity of the power
signal and the attack duration for the different attack categories
are defined empirically.
Table II
SET OF INJECTED ATTACKS
ID Protocol Type Intensity Duration Frequency
1 WiFi DoS High Long (20min) 2430
2 WiFi Deauthentification Normal Short (1min) 2437
3 WiFi Rogue AP Normal Long (4min) 2412
4 BLE Man in the Middle Normal Long (4min) 2400-2500
5 Zigbee Fake association Normal Short (1min) 2470
6 Zigbee Fake data send Normal Long (4min) 2470
7 868MHz Simulated High Short (1min) 868
8 433MHz DoS High Long (10min) 433
2) Attack injection: The attacks are injected with an attack
generator tool that was purposely developed for the exper-
iments (due to space limitation, the description of the tool
is out of the scope of the paper). It provides an easy-to-use
interface to configure and to perform a particular set of attacks.
It records the time, called tattsend, of the attack generation. 20
attack campaigns were carried out. Each campaign is 3 hours
and 40 minutes long, with 1 hour separating two consecutive
campaigns. Each campaign includes 6 attacks (attack 2 to 7),
the duration of each attack depends on the type of attack (see
Table II), with 20mn separating two consecutive attacks. The
DOS attacks (attack 1 and 8) are performed only once at a
different period from the others.
C. Detection results
To evaluate the detection performance of the IDS, tra-
ditional metrics are computed: False Positives (FP ), True
Positives (TP ), False Negatives (FN ), True Negatives (TN ).
These metrics are used to calculate Precision, Recall and
True Negative Rate (TNR) defined as:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
TNR =
TN
TN + FP
These metrics are evaluated on the attack dataset collected
as explained in subsection VII-B. To compute them, it is
necessary to measure the error between the inputs and the
outputs of the autoencoder, thanks to the following equation:
Error(i) = outputi − inputi, i ∈ {1, 80}
Then, we implemented the detection method based on the
assessment of the likelihood of the observed error vector
including all the considered features. The likelihood is com-
puted based on the concepts described in [25] where the error
probability for each feature is approximated by a Gaussian
distribution. Then, an anomaly is notified when the probability
associated to the error vector exceeds a given threshold t. The
threshold is estimated empirically based on the analysis of the
TNR measured on the testing dataset.
In the first experiment, the first training dataset was used
to evaluate whether a model can correctly fit two weeks of
communications on three bandwidths. When the error rate is
sufficiently low, a.k.a. 0.1% of the maximum observed error,
it is considered that the model correctly fits the data. Next,
the corresponding testing dataset was used to determine how
to calculate the threshold to detect an anomaly. We calculated
the likelihood of the observed errors and evaluated the TNR
for different threshold values until there is only few or no FP .
For instance, for the 800-900MHz bandwidth, a threshold of
0.6 is perfect to have no FP on the testing data. The second
experiment was used to determine the detection performance
of the IDS on the attack dataset. The threshold was set
based on the corresponding testing data and the metrics were
evaluated with that threshold. Table III describes the results
for each bandwidth.
Figures 5 and 6 present the error plot on the 800-900 MHz
bandwidth for the testing and the attack data respectively.
The blue marks on figure 6 identify the starting dates of the
attacks. For this example, the error patterns computed on the
attack data show significant deviations compared to the test
dataset. In presence of attacks, as shown in figure 6, the error
is far superior than the highest error computed from the testing
dataset (depicted in figure 5).
Considering Table III results, it is shown that for the 800-
900 MHz and 400-500 MHz bandwidths, almost all attacks are
detected and only a few false alarms are raised. Moreover, as
800-900MHz bandwidth is shared by many protocols, better
detection performance are obtained when the analysis is done
at a finer granularity, e.g., by focusing only on the bandwidth
used by the attack (e.g., 860-870MHz for the 7th attack). The
results improve significantly as the IDS does not raise any
False Positive and only one attack is not detected.
Not surprisingly, the results for the 2400-2500MHz band-
width are mixed and show a higher variability. As this band-
width is used by several protocols (similarly to 800-900MHz),
we created several models at a finer granularity, for each
10MHz (e.g. 2400-2410, 2405-2415, etc.). The results improve
significantly: all the Rogue AP and DoS attacks are detected,
as well as more than half of the BLE attacks (57.46%). How-
ever, ZigBee attacks and the WiFi deauthentification attack
are not well detected. We believe that this is partly due to
our hardware (antenna, HackRF) which is not optimized for
this bandwidth. Moreover, the 2nd attack is short and uses the
same channel as the legitimate AP, therefore, probably these
attacks are too short to be easily detected. A longer learning
phase should improve the results and we plan to validate
this assumption in future work. An interesting behaviour was
observed about the IDS detection performance when Denial-
of-Service attacks (i.e., 1 and 8) were performed. The attack
signal itself is not well detected, especially on the 2400-2500
bandwidth. However, the effects of these attacks are clearly
recognizable, as the communications suddenly stop and some
devices start to send many messages during a short period
of time, and some beacons are no more received. Moreover,
when the DoS stops, the AP restarts and potentially changes
its communication channel. As a consequence, the radio-
communication activities observed after the DoS attack exhibit
different patterns in particular on the bandwidth associated to
the new channel (in our experiment 2400-2420 bandwidth),
compared to the learned reference model. In our experiment,
we consider that this effect corresponds to an attack, as this
behavior follows an illegitimate action.
VIII. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK
The first results show that RadIoT is able to detect most of
the attacks that we have carried out within a smarthome, even
during high periods of activity by the users. However, a few
attacks were not detected. In this work, the experimentation
Table III
RESULTS FOR EACH BANDWIDTH
Testing Attack
Bandwidth
(MHz)
ID
Attack
Threshold TNR Precision Recall
400-500 8 0.3 99.40% 99.83% 100.00%
800-900 7 0.6 99.60% 82.76% 92.31%
860-870 7 0.2 99.80% 100.00% 96.15%
2400-2500 1,2,3,4,5,6 0.3 98.61% 83.33% 1.15%
2410-2420 3 0.3 99.00% 98.99% 79.89%
2400-2410 4 0.3 97.01% 98.55% 57.46%
2465-2475 5,6 0.4 98.01% 10.00% 1.67%
2430-2440 1,2 0.6 99.60% 100.00% 4.00%
2420-2430 1 0.4 99.60% 100.00% 100.00%
was carried out with only one probe. However, it is very
difficult for a single probe to catch all the traffic and detect
an attack performed from outside or behind a load-bearing
wall. We believe that the performance of our IDS will be
significantly improved by deploying more probes and corre-
lating the activities between them. Experiments are planned in
the future to validate this assumption. For instance, to detect
more precisely an illegitimate source location of a signal, the
difference between the power received by different probes can
be learned. Therefore, the correlation between activities moni-
tored on different probes should provide better discrimination
between legitimate behaviors and attacks. Another possible
area of improvement would to use a more sensitive and precise
antenna than the one used in our experiments to better detect
attacks with a low power intensity. Moreover, an analysis has
to be performed to correctly consider all the potential physical
phenomena that can impact our IDS, such as the change of
the communication channel example.
Our model shows interesting results but some sensitivity
studies still have to be done. More precisely, more work on
the definition and experimentation of the activation functions,
the autoencoder architecture and features selections have to be
considered and may improve the detection performance of the
solution. It could also be interesting to build an adaptive model
that can learn continuously and adapt itself to the changes
that occur in a smarthome, for example a new device or a
big change in the users behaviour. Moreover, at this stage we
did not consider the difference between the communications
behaviors during the week and the week end, this should
improve significantly the learning of the legitimate behavior.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new intrusion detection solution called
RadIoT to protect connected areas like smart homes and smart
factories. It is based on the monitoring and the anomaly
detection of radio activity through neural networks. The first
experiment has been carried out in a smarthome equipped
with various connected objets. RadIoT shows relevant results
(88.46% Precision and Recall) for bandwidths that are not
usually covered by traditional IDS even though they are
frequently used in smarthome environment, e.g. 868MHz and
433MHz. Moreover, it is also able to detect some attacks
on IoT protocols (Rogue AP, BLE attacks) with only a
low configuration and a low-cost prototype, and with only
one antenna for all protocols. As future work, we plan to
continue the experimentation and use multiple probes, and also
validate our solution in other smart environments (such as a
smartfactory) which can be more or less constrained compared
to smarthome. We also plan to release the data and share it
with the scientific community to test other machine learning
techniques or algorithms.
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